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Over the past several decades in the US Congress, there has been
a decline in the fraction of bills introduced that eventually become
law. This decline in legislative effectiveness has occurred in parallel
with rising levels of political polarization, where coordination occurs
primarily within and not between groups, which are often defined by
political party affiliation. However, in part due to challenges in mea-
suring political polarization, the link between effectiveness and po-
larization is unclear. In this article, we have two goals. Methodolog-
ically, we propose a general method for identifying opposing coali-
tions in signed networks. Substantively, we use the partisanship of
such coalitions in the US Congress since 1979 to examine the impact
of polarization on rates of bill passage. Based on the legislative pro-
cess used by the US Congress, it might be expected that a chamber’s
bills are more likely to become law when the controlling party holds a
larger majority. However, we show that changes in bill passage rates
are better explained by the partisanship of a chamber’s largest coali-
tion, which we identify by partitioning a signed network of legislators
into two mutually opposing, but internally cohesive groups.
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Within the field of comparative US politics, two topics
attract particular attention at the federal level: legislative ef-
fectiveness and political polarization. Legislative effectiveness
refers to the ability of individual legislators (1, 2), or of an
entire legislative body (3), to advance their agenda, typically
by facilitating the passage of legislation. Political polariza-
tion (when applied to elected officials or “elites”) refers to
the formation of non-overlapping ideologically homogeneous
groups (4, 5). When these groups mirror political party af-
filiations, as they do in the United States (i.e. Republicans
and Democrats), it is also called partisan polarization. For
several decades, legislative effectiveness in the US has declined
(as illustrated in Figure 1), while partisan polarization has
increased (5). These trends have led many to hypothesize that
they are related, and specifically that “unified party control
has [not] been legislatively more productive than divided party
control” (6, xii).
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Fig. 1. The fraction of bills that eventually become law (bill passage rate) indicating
legislative effectiveness in 96th - 114th sessions of the US Congress (1979-2016)
Most research on performance of political systems, and on
the link between polarization and legislative effectiveness, has
focused on legislators’ ideological positions (7), role of political
parties (8, 9), and majority party size (10) within legislative
chambers. However, others have suggested that a focus on par-
ties to explain the dynamics of the US Congress is misguided
(11). Parties are administrative conveniences that facilitate
coordination and often serve as a useful heuristic for their mem-
bers’ ideology, but because party affiliation is different from
ideological position, a focus on political parties oversimplifies
matters by assuming within-party ideological homogeneity
and between-party ideological heterogeneity. Therefore, in
this paper, we adopt a different approach, focusing not on
legislators’ political party affiliations, but instead focusing on
their network of positive and negative interactions with each
other during a two-year session. We find that this approach –
examining polarization from the perspective of networks and
structural balance – offers a better explanation of legislative
effectiveness than political parties.
We use signed networks for modeling legislators and their
relationships because they include both positive and nega-
tive edges, which better represent the potential complexity
of political alliances. Specifically, we use signed networks of
legislators (12, 13) inferred from bill-cosponsorship data for US
Senate and House of Representatives between 1979 and 2016.
In each signed network, a pair of legislators have a positive
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relation (e.g. of collaboration) if they co-sponsored many of
the same bills, and have a negative relation (e.g. of avoidance)
if they co-sponsored few of the same bills. A stochastic degree
sequence model (SDSM) (12) is used to define thresholds of
“many” and “few.” Previous research (5) on the same data
has shown an increase in polarization in the US Congress
when measured by the triangle index, which provides a locally-
aggregated index of polarization based on structural balance
(14). However, the triangle index only measures the level of
balance and polarization, but does not identify the members
of the political coalitions that are polarized. For this we turn
to the frustration index (15–17) (also known as the line index
of balance (18)), which optimally partitions a signed graph
into two opposing but internally cohesive “coalitions” (19).
Substantively, these coalitions (20) represent groups of legis-
lators who are political allies, but who are political enemies
with those in the other coalition. In our analyses of legislative
effectiveness, we focus on the level of partisanship within the
largest, and therefore controlling, coalition.
Computing the frustration index is an NP-hard problem
(21) so is the equivalent partitioning problem which deals
with minimizing the total number of intra-group negative and
inter-group positive edges. Most studies on this topic use
heuristic methods for partitioning signed networks under simi-
lar objectives (22–25). These methods are not guaranteed to
provide the optimal solution or even its approximation within
a constant factor (21, 26), but can potentially be implemented
on larger networks.
Computing the exact value of frustration index, in princi-
ple, involves searching among all possible ways to partition a
given signed network into k ≤ 2 groups in order to find the
partitioning which minimizes the total number of intra-group
negative and inter-group positive edges. We propose a new
method for tackling the intensive computations by providing
upper and lower bounds for this number, then solving an opti-
mization model which closes the gap between the two bounds
and returns the exact value of frustration index alongside the
optimal partitioning of vertices.
Signed graph and balance theory preliminaries
In this section, we recall some basic definitions of signed graphs
and balance theory.
Signed graphs. We consider an undirected signed graph G =
(V,E, σ) where V and E are the sets of vertices and edges
respectively, and σ is the sign function σ : E → {−1,+1}.
Graph G contains |V | = n nodes. The set E of edges contains
m− negative edges and m+ positive edges adding up to a total
of |E| = m = m+ +m− edges. The signed adjacency matrix
and the unsigned adjacency matrix are denoted by A and |A|
respectively. Their entries are defined in Eq. (1) and Eq. (2).
auv =
{
σ(u,v) if (u, v) ∈ E
0 if (u, v) /∈ E [1]
|auv| =
{
1 if (u, v) ∈ E
0 if (u, v) /∈ E [2]
Balance and cycles. A cycle of length k in G is a sequence of
nodes v0, v1, ..., vk−1, vk such that for each i = 1, 2, ..., k there
is an edge from vi−1 to vi and the nodes in the sequence except
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Fig. 2. (A) An example signed network. (B) Evaluating balance using triangles. (C)
Evaluating balance using frustration.
for v0 = vk are distinct. The sign of a cycle is the product of
the signs of its edges. A cycle with negative (positive) sign
is unbalanced (balanced). A balanced network (graph) is one
with no negative cycles.
Balance theory is conceptualized by Heider in the context
of social psychology (27). It was then formulated as a set
of graph-theoretic conditions by Cartwright and Harary (28)
which define a signed graph to be balanced if all its cycles
are positive. Cartwright and Harary also introduce measuring
the level of balance using, among other indices, the fraction
of positive cycles (28, page 288). Three years later, Harary
suggested using frustration index (18) (under a different name);
a measure which satisfies key axiomatic properties (17), but
has been underused for decades due to the complexity involving
its computation (26, 29, 30). In more recent studies, methods
involving matrix multiplication (14) and graph optimization
(29) were introduced for measuring partial balance (17) which
we discuss next.
Evaluating balance and frustration
In this section, we explain our computational approach to
analyzing signed networks by providing brief definitions and
discussions on measuring balance, frustration and partitioning,
and graph optimization models.
Measuring partial balance. Signed networks representing real
data are often unbalanced, which motivates measuring the
intermediate level of partial balance (17). The first measure
we use is triangle index denoted by T (G) which equals the
fraction of positive cycles of length 3 (28, 31). We use Eq. (3)
suggested in (14) for computing T (G) in which Tr(A) denotes
the trace (sum of diagonal entries) of A.
T (G) = Tr(A
3) + Tr(|A|3)
2Tr(|A|3) [3]
The other measure we use is the normalized frustration
index (17) denoted by F (G) and expressed in Eq. (4). This
measure is based on the frustration index (15, 18, 32) which
equals the minimum number of edges whose removal results in
a balanced graph. The frustration index is denoted by L(G)
in Eq. (4) and its formal definition is provided in the next
subsection.
F (G) = 1− 2L(G)/m [4]
Figure 2 (A) shows an example signed graph in which
the three dotted lines represent negative edges and the four
solid lines represent positive edges. The level of balance in this
signed graph can be evaluated using triangles (B) or frustration
(C). The former approach, (B), involves identifying triangle 1-
4-5 as unbalanced and triangle 1-3-4 as balanced leading to the
numeric index T (G) = 1/2. The latter approach, (C), involves
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finding a partitioning of vertices {{1, 2, 3}, {4, 5}} (shown by
green and purple colors in Figure 2) which minimizes the total
number of intra-group negative and inter-group positive edges
to L(G) = 1 (only edge (1, 5) according to this partitioning)
leading to the numeric index F (G) = 5/7. Note that removing
edge (1, 5) leads to a balanced signed graph.
Frustration and partitioning. Given signed graph G =
(V,E, σ), we can partition V into two subsets: X and V \X.
We let binary variable xi denote the subset which node i be-
longs to under partitioning {X,V \X}, where xi = 1 if i ∈ X
and xi = 0 otherwise.
A positive edge (i, j) ∈ E+ is said to be frustrated if its
endpoints i and j belong to different subsets (xi 6= xj). A
negative edge (i, j) ∈ E− is said to be frustrated if its endpoints
i and j belong to the same subset (xi = xj). We define the
frustration count fG(X) as the number of frustrated edges of
G under partitioning {X,V \X}:
fG(X) =
∑
(i,j)∈E
fij(X)
where fij(X) is the frustration state of edge (i, j), given by
fij(X) =

0, if xi = xj and (i, j) ∈ E+
1, if xi = xj and (i, j) ∈ E−
0, if xi 6= xj and (i, j) ∈ E−
1, if xi 6= xj and (i, j) ∈ E+.
[5]
The frustration index of a graph G can be computed exactly
by finding partitioning X∗, V \X∗ ⊆ V of G that minimizes
the frustration count fG(X), i.e., solving Eq. (6) (26, 29).
L(G) = min
X⊆V
fG(X) [6]
Recent studies on frustration index and signed networks
suggest (26, 29) and implement (30) efficient graph optimiza-
tion models to compute the frustration index of relatively large
(up to 105 edges) sparse networks. However, the signed net-
works we analyze have substantially higher densities compared
to the instances in (26, 29, 30). This requires developing new
computational models for tackling the intensive computations
involved in obtaining the frustration index of dense graphs.
Bounding the frustration index. In this subsection, we discuss
obtaining lower and upper bounds for the frustration index.
Using these bounds is a way of substantially reducing the
running time, but theoretically they are not required.
The linear programming relaxation (LP relaxation) of the
binary optimization models in (26, 29) can be used to com-
pute a lower bound for the frustration index. The linear
programming model in Eq. (7) is developed for this purpose.
In Eq. (7), T = {(i, j, k) ∈ V 3 | (i, j), (i, k), (j, k) ∈ E} is
the set which contains ordered 3-tuples of nodes whose edges
form a triangle in G. The continuous linear programming
model in Eq. (7) is developed by combining the LP relaxation
of the 0/1 linear model in (29)[Subsection 4.3] and the triangle
constraints in (29)[Subsection 4.4]. It follows from the LP
relaxation that the optimal solution Y ∗ to the model in Eq. (7)
is a lower bound for the frustration index Y ∗ ≤ L(G).
min
xi,xij
Y =
∑
(i,j)∈E+
xi + xj − 2xij
+
∑
(i,j)∈E−
1− (xi + xj − 2xij)
s.t. xij ≤ (xi + xj)/2 ∀(i, j) ∈ E+
xij ≥ xi + xj − 1 ∀(i, j) ∈ E−
xi + xjk ≥ xij + xik ∀(i, j, k) ∈ T
xj + xik ≥ xij + xjk ∀(i, j, k) ∈ T
xk + xij ≥ xik + xjk ∀(i, j, k) ∈ T
1 + xij + xik + xjk ≥ xi + xj + xk ∀(i, j, k) ∈ T
xi ∈ [0, 1] ∀i ∈ V
xij ∈ [0, 1] ∀(i, j) ∈ E
[7]
Any given partitioning {X,V \X} for signed graph G is as-
sociated with a frustration count fG(X) which is by definition
(as in Eq. (6)) an upper bound for the frustration index
fG(X∗) = L(G) ≤ fG(X) ∀X ⊆ V.
We use a specific partitioning {X ′, V \X ′} as a starting
point to “warm-start” the algorithm for computing the frus-
tration index. Partitioning {X ′, V \ X ′} groups nodes into
two subsets based on the party affiliation of legislators. To be
more precise, for node i which represents a legislator, decision
variable xi is given initial value 0 if the reciprocal legislator is
a Democrat and xi is given initial value 1 otherwise.
Computing the frustration index. After bounding the frustra-
tion index, we use the binary linear programming model in
Eq. (8) which minimizes the number of frustrated edges. The
binary variables of the model are fij ∀(i, j) ∈ E which denotes
frustration of edge (i, j) and xi∀i ∈ V which denotes the subset
of node i. To warm-start the algorithm which solves Eq. (8),
we initialize xi variables based on partitioning {X ′, V \X ′}.
The model in Eq. (8) is developed by combining the XOR
model in (26)[Subsection 3.2] with an additional constraint to
incorporate the lower bound Y ∗ obtained from Eq. (7).
min
xi,fij
Z =
∑
(i,j)∈E
fij
s.t. fij ≥ xi − xj ∀(i, j) ∈ E+
fij ≥ xj − xi ∀(i, j) ∈ E+
fij ≥ xi + xj − 1 ∀(i, j) ∈ E−
fij ≥ 1− xi − xj ∀(i, j) ∈ E−∑
(i,j)∈E
fij ≥ Y ∗
xi ∈ {0, 1} ∀i ∈ V
fij ∈ {0, 1} ∀(i, j) ∈ E
[8]
We implement a speed-up technique known as prioritized
branching (26) and solve the binary linear programming model
in Eq. (8) using Gurobi solver (version 8.0) (33) on a virtual
machine with 32 Intel Xeon CPU E5-2698 v3 @ 2.30 GHz pro-
cessors and 32 GB of RAM running 64-bit Microsoft Windows
Server 2012 R2 Standard.
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Results
In this section, we provide the results of analyzing balance
and frustration in signed networks of US Congress legislators.
Polarization and partial balance. We evaluate the level of par-
tial balance using two different methods. Figure 3 illustrates
partial balance in the signed networks of the US Congress
over time measured by the triangle index and normalized frus-
tration index. Values of the two measures, T (G) and F (G),
are highly correlated (correlation coefficients are 0.95 and 0.91
respectively for House and Senate networks) and both show
relatively high levels of partial balance which have increased in
the time period 1979-2016. The results in Figure 3 indicate an
increase in the polarization of both chambers of US Congress,
which is in accordance with the literature (4, 5, 34–36).
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Fig. 3. Two measures of partial balance indicating an overall increase in political
polarization in the US Congress over the time period 1979-2016
Computational results on frustration. Solving the continuous
optimization model in Eq. (7) and the discrete (binary) opti-
mization model in Eq. (8) requires intensive computations for
large instances such as signed networks of the House. Given
the size and density of these instances, the models in Eq. (7)
and Eq. (8) have thousands of variables and possibly millions
of constraints requiring a high performance computer taking
advantage of parallel computing capabilities (30).
For example, the signed graph instance of the 113th House
session has m = 75, 771 edges and |T | = 7, 102, 625 triangles
which result in a total of m+4|T | = 28, 486, 271 constraints for
the model in Eq. (7). Gurobi solver takes 5300 seconds (around
1.5 hours) to solve the model in Eq. (7) to global optimality
and return Y ∗, the lower bound for the frustration index. For
the same instance, the discrete optimization model in Eq. (8)
has n+m = 76, 218 binary variables and 2m+ 1 = 151, 543
constraints. This large instance takes 43, 523 seconds (around
12 hours) for Gurobi to reach global optimality and return the
frustration index and the partitioning of the nodes. In total for
the 113th session of the House, it takes 48, 823 seconds (around
13.5 hours) to compute the exact value of the frustration
index which is the longest solve time among all instances.
The average computation time for House instances is 17, 763
seconds (around 5 hours) and the standard deviation is 15, 411
seconds (around 4.5 hours). For Senate instances, the average
computation time is 4 seconds and the standard deviation is 6
seconds.
Partitioning and largest coalition. Using the optimal values of
the xi variables obtained by solving the discrete optimization
model in Eq. (8), we partition nodes of each network into two
groups (subsets X∗, V \X∗). For each signed network, either
X∗ or V \ X∗ has the larger set cardinality and therefore
represents the largest coalition for the corresponding session.
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Fig. 4. The number of legislators from the two main parties who belong to the con-
trolling coalition indicating an increase in the partisan homogeneity of the controlling
coalition in 96th - 114th sessions of the US Congress (1979-2016)
We evaluate the composition of the largest and therefore
controlling coalitions in each session and chamber based on
the party affiliation of its legislators. Figure 4 illustrates the
number of legislators from the two main political parties in
the controlling coalitions of the US Congress. As it can be
seen in Figure 4, the controlling coalitions have become more
homogeneous (i.e. partisan) over the time period 1979-2016.
Mediation in bill passage. Using a bivariate linear regression,
we find that the percentage of bills introduced in a chamber
that become law (passage rate) significantly declines over time.
The passage rate has declined in the House by an average of
0.11 percentage points each session (β = −0.528, p < 0.05),
and in the Senate by an average of 0.35 percentage points each
session (β = −0.852, p < 0.01; see Figure 5 A).∗ To investigate
possible explanations, we estimate two separate structural
equation models for each chamber. A commonsense model
tests the expectation that when the majority party holds a
larger numerical majority, they should have greater success
passing bills (10). The key variable in this model, party control,
is defined as the absolute difference between the number of
Republicans and Democrats. Its computation does not require
any information about the legislators’ network. We find no
support for this model; party control does not mediate the
relationship between time and passage rate. (see Figure 5 B).
A more nuanced model tests the expectation that when the
controlling coalition is more partisan and thus more ideolog-
ically unified, it will have greater success passing bills. The
key variable in this mode, coalition partisanship, is defined
as the fraction of non-independent members in the largest
coalition that affiliate with that coalition’s dominant political
party (see Figure 4). Clearly, this variable requires knowledge
of the legislators’ network and a method to partition that
network into internally cohesive opposing coalitions. We find
support for this model in the US House, but not the US Senate
(see Figure 5). Specifically, we find that in the House, the
partisan homogeneity of the controlling coalition has increased
over time (β = 0.771, p < .01), which is consistent with past
findings concerning polarization (5), and that coalition homo-
geneity increases passage rates (β = 0.661, p < 0.05), which is
consistent with our expectation about the impact of ideological
unity. Together, these effects imply a significant and positive
indirect effect of time on the passage rate (β = 0.510, p < .05),
mediated by coalition partisanship. Thus, the observed decline
in bill passage rates in the US House would have been worse
(direct effect: β = −1.038, p < .01), but was mitigated by
increasingly ideologically homogeneous coalitions, which are a
protective factor against declines in legislative effectiveness.
∗We report standardized coefficients (β) to facilitate cross-model comparisons. The percentage
point changes are unstandardized bivariate regression coefficients, reported here for context.
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Session PassageRate
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C
Fig. 5. Predicting the rate of bill passage in the US House of Representatives and
Senate; Standardized coefficients are reported; ∗ ∗ p < .01, ∗p < .05. (A) Over
time, the passage rate has declined. (B) The decline is not mediated by changes in
the size of a party’s majority in a chamber. (C) In the House, but not the Senate, it is
mediated by the partisan homogeneity in the controlling coalition.
Summary and Conclusions
In this study we proposed a general method for identifying
internally cohesive opposing coalitions in signed networks of
legislators based on structural balance theory, then applied
this method to identify opposing coalitions in the US Congress,
showing that these coalitions’ partisanship can explain changes
in legislative effectiveness better than political parties. Based
on this analysis, we offer a series of substantive and method-
ological conclusions.
Consistent with prior studies (4, 5, 34–36), we find that po-
larization has increased in both the US Senate and US House of
Representatives, and that this polarization has largely mirrored
partisan divisions along political party lines. We operational-
ized polarization using the level of a signed graph’s structural
balance, and therefore measure what (5) calls “strong polar-
ization,” but have used two different measures of balance. We
find that the two measures are highly correlated and both
support the conclusion of increasing polarization.
The triangle index is easy to compute, but provides only
a locally-aggregated measure of a graph’s level of balance.
In contrast, computing the frustration index is difficult, but
it provides not only a global measure of a graph’s level of
balance, but also the optimal partitioning of vertices into
internally cohesive but mutually antagonist groups. We have
demonstrated a practical method for computing the exact
value of frustration index and identifying the optimal partition
in dense graphs of |E|  50000 that involves first obtaining
upper and lower bounds, using exogenous node properties (e.g.
legislators’ political party affiliations), and solving a large-scale
binary linear programming model. In the context of legislative
networks, this method allows us to identify the most cohesive
coalitions of legislators under conditions of balance theory.
Although our computational innovations make the identi-
fication of internally cohesive opposing coalitions practically
feasible, we must also demonstrate that these coalitions are
more informative than other simpler grouping possibilities. In
the legislative context, we show that the partisan composition
of these cohesive coalitions better explain the declining leg-
islative effectiveness in the US House of Representatives than
simply examining legislators’ political party affiliations. This
affirms Mayhew’s claim that “no theoretical treatment of the
United States Congress that posits parties as analytic units
will go very far” (11, p.27) but goes a step further by identify-
ing an alternative analytic unit – internally cohesive opposing
coalitions – that does have explanatory power. Importantly,
coalitions appear useful only for explaining the legislative ef-
fectiveness of the House, but not the Senate. However, this
is also consistent with existing political science theory that
“the lack of majority control of [procedural] processes in the
Senate negates the possibility of significant party [or other
group-based] effects in that body” (37, p.7). Therefore, in
general terms, our empirical findings suggest that in legisla-
tive bodies where a sufficiently large group of legislators can
influence procedure, the composition of the largest coalition is
more important than the size of the majority party’s major-
ity. This is perhaps obvious in parliamentary systems where
multi-party coalition forming is essential, but is noteworthy
in the non-parliamentary US Congress.
These conclusions have some significant implications for
both the future study of signed networks, and of the link
between polarization and legislative effectiveness. First, by
providing a practical method for computing the frustration
index of relatively dense graphs, we hope to move the study
of signed graphs beyond merely determining the level of bal-
ance, and toward the study of how the composition of mostly
opposing groups impact other network dynamics. Second, our
empirical findings suggest that research on polarization and its
impact on the legislative process should look beyond political
parties and partisanship to more subtle but influential forms
of coordination, such as internally cohesive coalitions which
are antagonist towards one another.
Materials and Methods
Our method of analysis is different from the conventional methods of
indexing legislators partisanship (38–40) which place each legislator
on a scale of liberal to conservative. These methods are shown
to produce results correlating with important historical events in
the US politics and therefore are standard practice in quantifying
polarization (41). While these methods indicate the political climate
as a whole, they are not designed to take network relations of
legislators into account.
Relations of collaboration and opposition between elected officials
are difficult to collect directly because politicians have limited
time to participate in surveys and have good reasons to conceal
their true political relations. Therefore, studies of elected officials’
political networks typically measure these relations indirectly, using
bipartite projections focusing on their co-sponsorship of bills (42),
co-voting on bills (36, 41, 43), co-membership on committees (44),
and co-attendance at press events (45). For a range of substantive
reasons noted by (5) (e.g. relatively few bills are actually voted
on, committee memberships are driven by such non-ideological
factor such as seniority), we examine political relations from bill co-
sponsorship. Specifically, we examine a signed network of inferred
positive and negative political relations among the members of the
US House of Representatives, and among the members of the US
Senate, in each session of Congress from 1979 to 2016 (96th session –
114th session). These signed networks are described in detail by (5)
and are available in a public Figshare data repository (13). Although
data on earlier sessions are available, we exclude them because prior
to the 96th session, House rules imposed a limit of 25 co-sponsors
per bill, which artificially distorts co-sponsorship patterns and limits
the usefulness of these data for inferring political networks (46).
These data do not distinguish between a bill’s “sponsor” and its
“co-sponsors” because the former is simply the legislator whose name
appears first in a potentially long list of legislators responsible for
the bill’s introduction.
Importantly, all pairs of legislators co-sponsor at least some
Aref et al. | 5
of the same bills, so we know that the mere existence of some
co-sponsorships does not imply they collaborate, and that some
number of co-sponsorships can actually indicate avoidance. A
stochastic degree sequence model (SDSM) (12) is used to define
thresholds of collaboration and avoidance by building the empirical
sampling distribution of two legislators’ joint co-sponsorships under
a null model in which each legislator co-sponsored approximately
the same number of bills and each bill received approximately
the same number of co-sponsorships (i.e. holding approximately
constant the legislator and bill degree sequence). Decisions about
whether a given dyad has a positive or negative relation are made
by comparing their observed number of joint co-sponsorships to
the empirical sampling distribution; here a two-tailed α = 0.05
threshold is used. This approach differs from other methods of
reducing weighted graphs to binary or signed graphs (47, 48) because
it explicitly incorporates information from the original bipartite
data (i.e. legislators linked to bills), thereby ensuring it is not lost
when these data are projected as a unipartite graph. Additionally,
we examine the extracted signed backbone networks rather than
the weighted bipartite projections because the weights in those
projections are distorted by heterogeneity in the bipartite degree
sequences (i.e. some legislators sponsor many bills, others sponsor
few; (12, 49)).
Although these data represent a time-series of legislative inter-
actions, we examine the networks cross-sectionally for two reasons.
First, there are a large number of joiners and leavers in each new
session as incumbents lose their seats, freshmen join Congress, or
representatives become senators, making most dynamic models im-
practical to estimate. Second, although some political relationships
develop over long periods of time, the effectiveness of any particular
session of Congress can be evaluated independently.
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